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It might seem, and has seemed to many, that what I think is up to me. I go about life represent-
ing the world with thoughts, and my intrinsic state fixes the content of those thoughts—fixes,
that is, what they require of the world in order to be true. Call this idea internalism about mental
content (henceforth, internalism). Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne (henceforth, YVH)
have written a book that attempts to refute internalism in all its reasonable manifestations.
There is much of value in Narrow Content. The central argument, with its protagonist Mirror
Man, constitutes a formidable stumbling-block that all future internalists will have to contend
with. And the authors have done substantial work to iron out a more precise characterization of
the conceptual landscape than existed hitherto. That said, the book is not without frustrations,
for reasons both stylistic and substantive. Stylistically, while the authors are admirably clear
about defining the views at issue, they’re not always great about explaining why the definitions
are as they are, especially in cases where their framework is more complicated than what you
might have expected. Substantively (and, I’ll argue, relatedly), the authors largely neglect to
address one of the most prominent roles certain philosophers (e.g. Dennett, Stalnaker, and
Lewis) have taken content to play, that of explaining and predicting behavior. It’s not clear,
so I’ll argue, that the central argument of the book refutes internalists of that kind.
The main thread
Narrow Content takes up a project invented by Putnam and Burge. Putnam (its closest spiritual
predecessor) convinced many that the content of our thoughts about water depends on more
than us; it depends also on what has caused our water experiences. Here on Earth, that’s H2O,
so my thought that I behold water is true just in case I behold H2O. My qualitatively identical
twin, on a planet like Earth except that the watery stu there comprises XYZ , has a thought
internally just like mine. But if he beheld H2O, his thought would be false, for his thoughts
concern XYZ . Since our qualitatively identical thoughts in our qualitatively identical heads
dier in truth, what they require of the world to be true (their content) is not fixed internally.
The opponents of Putnam/Burge whom YVH are concerned to refute are those who try
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nonetheless to find a “theoretically interesting” notion of content shared between me and my
twin. Two-dimensionalists, e.g., hold that while my twin and I entertain dierent contents
in some sense, we share content in another. On the simplest version, primary contents (the
narrow ones) are functions from world-agent pairs 〈w, a〉 to truth values. My twin and I both
believe that a beholds the stu that generally plays the water role for a in w. However his
thought might still be false and mine true, for this content gets evaluated relative to dierent
agents.
The central claim of Narrow Content is that enrichments like this will not do. YVH purport
to describe a single agent, Mirror Man, who, at a single time, thinks two qualitatively indis-
tinguishable thoughts that dier in truth value. Think of Mirror Man as Ethan and Twin
Ethan crammed into one body. Mirror Man is a left-right symmetric agent. Every time he
thinks a thought with his left side, he thinks a corresponding thought with his right. With
his right side he perceives Kit Fine, and truly judges him to be human. With his left side he
perceives a perfect wax copy of Kit Fine, and falsely judges it to be human. Two qualitatively
identical thoughts, same world, same agent, dierent truth values. Thus either more indices
are required, or content does not supervene narrowly.
This is the core of what YVH call the parameter proliferation argument. Further epicycles abound,
all with a common structure: Whatever new indices the narrow content theorist adds to the
supervenience base, YVH whip up some novel variation of the Mirror Man story to supply
two thoughts with the same indices of occurrence but intuitively dierent truth-values.
To formalize this argument, YVH must give a definition of internalism that allows them to
distinguish simultaneous, qualitatively identical thoughts within a single agent. As we’ll see,
this constitutes some of the more interesting aspects of the book, and its more frustrating ones.
They spend Chapter 1—all 45 pages of it!—defining internalism. Chapter 2 sketches their
argument against narrow content. The next two chapters deal with specific job descriptions
for content in light of this argument: serving as the referents of that-clauses (Chapter 3), and
explaining a priori entailment between thoughts (Chapter 4). The final two chapters take up
the prospects for weakened versions of internalism—weakened by dropping the qualitative
supervenience requirement (Chapter 5), and by allowing relations between thoughts to figure
into the supervenience base (Chapter 6).
Qualitative agential proles
You might be surprised—I was surprised—that it takes 45 pages to define internalism. Why
does it take so long to flesh out the basic idea that what I think depends only on me? Indeed,
Williamson (e.g.) requires but one paragraph for this task:
A case [basically a centered world] α is internally like a case β if and only if
the total internal physical state of the agent in α is exactly the same as the total
internal physical state of the agent in β. A condition C is narrow if and only
if for all cases α and β, if α is internally like β then C obtains in α if and only
if C obtains in β. In other terminology, narrow conditions supervene on or are
determined by the internal physical state: no dierence in whether they obtain
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without a dierence in that state. (Williamson 2000, 52)
The kinds of conditions relevant for narrow content are ones like “believing that one beholds
water”. If the holding of that condition depends only on the complete physical state of the
relevant agent, that condition is (more or less) what YVH call “coarsely narrow”.
YVH’s definition requires more machinery. The internal part of Williamson’s cases are states
of whole agents, and the relevant conditions apply (or not) to whole agents. This won’t do
for YVH’s purposes; their definition applies to particular token thoughts within an agent. It
relies on what they call the qualitative agential prole (QAP) of a thought, i.e. the conjunction
of all intrinsic qualitative relations that hold between the thought and its bearer. A content
assignment, assigning contents to thoughts, is narrow just in case it supervenes on QAPs.
Internalism is the view that there is a theoretically interesting narrow content assignment
satisfying plausible conditions.
With these definitions in hand, YVH can formulate the Mirror Man argument. Since Mirror
Man is symmetric, his left thought l and right thought r have the same QAP. (Assuming, that
is, that “being located in the left side of” does not constitute a qualitative relation—more
on that later.) So any narrow content assignment must assign l and r the same content, in
which case the thoughts, having as they do the same index of evaluation, must be true or false
together, contradicting our intuitive judgments of the case.
Why so complicated?
Why, apart from being indispensable for their argument, do YVH think we need to switch
from coarse narrowness to QAPs? The answer comes on page 48, in the form of a case
purportedly pulling narrowness apart from coarse narrowness. They ask us to imagine two
duplicate brains each with a red and a blue hemisphere. Each hemisphere contains exactly
one thought. Take a content assignment according to which both brains believe p and q, but in
Brain 1 the blue hemisphere’s thought gets assigned p whereas in Brain 2 the red hemisphere’s
does.
This, YVH say, is consistent with that content assignment’s being coarsely narrow but not
with its being narrow in their sense. The idea is that Brain 1 and Brain 2 as wholes believe all
the same things, and so constitute no counterexample to coarse narrowness. But since which
half realizes which belief changes without any corresponding change in the QAP, the content
assignment is not narrow.
Ok, fine, the two notions come apart—but which is closer to the intuitive idea? YVH argue
that it must be theirs, on the basis of the following modification: Any possible duplicate of
Brain 1 gets p assigned to the blue hemisphere i it is located within a mile of a baboon
(otherwise the red). “In this example”, YVH contend, “it is clear that the ur-content of a
thought depends on the environment of the agent of the thought, so is not intuitively narrow.
It is also not narrow according to our definition. Yet content is coarsely narrow in the example”
(48). QED; the finer-grained definition that accommodates Mirror Man is actually necessary
to elucidate the underlying concept.
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However, those who accept a minimal kind of holism about propositional attitudes are unlikely
to be moved by this argument. YVH bake into the description of the case that Brain 1 and
Brain 2 have thought tokens located in various parts of their brains, and trade on the intuition
that if which part realizes which belief depends on whether a baboon is nearby, that content
assignment is intuitively wide. But the very idea that distinct thoughts can be pinpointed to
specific brain regions is one that many would happily deny. Stalnaker, for instance, denies
that we have any way of isolating a particular thought token without reference to content:
It is not at all clear in the case of beliefs, intentions, and other states and attitudes
that one can identify something that is the belief or intention in abstraction from
its content, something about which we can ask, what would the content of that
belief have been if it had been a belief I had on Twin Earth. (Stalnaker 1990)
Stalnaker’s thought is that we have a grip on the notion of contentful mental states largely
by reference to the explanation and prediction of the behavior of agents. To ascribe to Fido
the thought that a bone-treat is forthcoming is to expect Fido to behave in certain bone-treat-
directed ways—by, e.g., tail-wagging, greedy staring in the direction of the bone-treat closet,
pitiful whines in the direction of his owner, etc.
YVH are pretty clearly adopting the language-of-thought model that Stalnaker lambastes in
Stalnaker (1984). They are happy to assume—indeed as parts of the very descriptions of
their critical cases—that thoughts come in tokens, have parts, have physical locations, are
intelligible as thoughts independently of their contents (so that dierent content assignments
can assign dierent contents to the same one), etc. Ocially they are not committed to a
specific language of thought thesis, and they acknowledge, e.g. on page 20, that “perhaps some
thoughts are diusely located, perhaps underwritten by the agent’s pattern of behavioural
dispositions”—but key moves made later on in the book belie this allowance.
This red/blue hemisphere business precisely one such move. We are to accept as part of the
description of the case itself that there is a thought lurking in the red half, and another lurking
in the blue half, about which it makes sense to ask about their diering contents. It is hard to
imagine Stalnaker acquiescing without complaint. The relevant agent may well believe p and
q, but that’s as fine-grained as it goes. About no particular entity in his colorfully bifurcated
brain does it make any sense to ask, “is this the thought whose content is p?”
Some complaints in this vicinity troubled me, I confess, on my first encounter with Mirror
Man himself. What makes Mirror Man a single agent, rather than a pair of Siamese twins?
What does Mirror Man as a whole believe? Are his halves functionally integrated? Is it an
accident that his halves are symmetric, or is he robustly set up that way? No one can object to
YVH providing us with a physical description of an entity and then asking for our intuitions
about its beliefs and desires; but to bake into the very setup that Mirror Man is a single
agent, in which two token thoughts separately occur, each located determinately in a dierent
hemisphere—this is to paper over by fiat what I would think are the most interesting questions
to ask about their creature.
And anyway, I suspect that many who incline towards internalism do so partly on the basis
of behavioristic inclinations. Every undergraduate has thought: “But Oscar and Twin-Oscar
would act in all of the same ways in the presence of their redistributed liquids! Neither of
4
them would complain upon quenching his thirst with the wrong one! Doesn’t that mean
something importantly contentful is shared?” Correct or not, that this is a natural way to state
the internalistic hunch ought to make one a bit suspicious of the machinery YVH require for
their supposed refutation.
Left and right
One final thought about the strength of the thesis Narrow Content purports to establish. Its
central argument relies on the idea that left-right orientation does not constitute a qualitative
property. If the property of being located on the left side of its agent were a qualitative
property of a thought token, then Mirror Man’s left and right thoughts would dier in QAP.
YVH consider on p. 90 a symmetry-breaking response in terms of the dierent phenomenologies
of left and right, but reject it: they are committed, and must be committed, to the idea that “a
pair of left and right gloves could be intrinsic duplicates”.
There are, I am told, chemical molecules called enantiomers that are perfect molecular mirrors
of each other. Oranges and lemons, for example, both contain a molecule called limonene. It
comes in two orientations: one finds limonene+ in oranges, and its enantiomer, limonene-, in
lemons. The gustatory dierence between the two fruits owes, apparently, to this dierence in
orientation.1
Suppose (now counterfactually) that oranges and lemons were perfectly identical, save for
the dierence in limonene+ vs limonene-. Then if YVH are correct, an orange and a lemon
might be perfect qualitative duplicates. Limonene+ and limonene- do not dier in any respect
save orientation; their dierent flavors arise from how they fit into our dierently oriented
tastebuds.
However, one looking to bake a lemon tart would consider himself duped, were his grocer to
sell him an orange when he requested a lemon. He could quite reasonably complain that there
was something wrong with the fruit he was handed. Now, perhaps for esoteric metaphysical
reasons, that complaint is strictly speaking incorrect. Nothing is wrong with the fruit; it’s a
perfect qualitative duplicate of one that would yield a proper lemon tart. Something is wrong
only with its relation to the baker’s taste buds.
If that’s right, then, contrary to what one might have expected, the condition of being a
lemon (or a limonene+ molecule) is wide. It depends not only on the intrinsic qualitative
properties of the fruit, but also on how its molecules happen to be oriented. But this hardly
suggests that its lemonhood is constitutively dependent on its environment in any particularly
deep sense. Suppose that left-right orientation is fixed by convention. There is, let us say,
a left-handed glove in a Paris vault that fixes what “left” means. Then it’s plausible that
lemonhood, while not ocially narrow, is wide only in a rather uninteresting sense: the fruit’s
intrinsic qualitative properties, together with one further non-qualitative fact relating it to the
Paris Glove, plausibly determine its lemonhood.
1No chemists were consulted in the writing of this review, and if the foregoing contains errors in this regard,
take the above to describe a mere metaphysical possibility. Since a box prepends each of YVH’s major claims, I
trust they will not complain on this account.
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When Oscar was reported to have dierent beliefs from his twin, this was taken to show that
content constitutively depends on the surrounding environment. It’s actual intercourse with
actual water that makes my water-thoughts concern H2O. This is what people have in mind
when they say that content is wide.
Consider now a slight weakening of internalism: A content assignment is quite narrow i it
supervenes on a thought’s QAP, together with one further fact: whether it occurs in the same
side of its agent as the direction the Paris Glove’s thumb points when observing it from the top.
Granted this allows some amount of extra-qualitative stu to factor into the supervenience
base. But it’s a far cry from the constitutive environmental dependence that fans of wide
content have advocated. Thought depends on its environment to no greater degree than a
lemon’s lemonhood depends on its environment. Bare sameness of orientation with respect
the Paris Glove all that’s required; other than that, QAP might well suce. If that is all that
the rejection of Narrow Content amounts to, it may not strike many as much.
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